Behavioral Analysis of Law
Cass R. Sunsteint
The future of economic analysis of law lies in new and better
understandings of decision and choice.'
In the last two decades, social scientists have learned a great
deal about how people actually make decisions.' Much of this
work calls for qualifications of rational choice models.3 Those
models are often wrong in the simple sense that they yield inaccurate predictions. Cognitive errors and motivational distortions
may press behavior far from the anticipated directions; normative
accounts of rational choice should not be confused with descriptive accounts.4 But it does not follow that people's behavior is unpredictable, systematically irrational, random, rule-free, or elusive to social scientists. On the contrary, the qualifications can be
described, used, and sometimes even modeled. Those qualifications, and the resulting understandings of decision and choice,5

t Karl N. Llewellyn Distinguished Service Professor, The University of Chicago, Law
School and Department of Political Science. I am grateful to J.B. Heaton, Judith Avrahami, Dan Kahan, Martha Nussbaum, Richard Pildes, Richard Posner, Eldar Shafir, and
Richard Thaler for valuable comments, and especially to Thaler and Daniel Kahneman for
helpful discussions of many relevant topics; none of the aforementioned people is responsible for mistakes and misconceptions. Some of the ideas developed here are discussed in
more detail in Cass R. Sunstein, Daniel Kahneman, and David Schkade, Assessing Punitive Damages (forthcoming Yale L J); Christine Jolls, Cass R. Sunstein, and Richard
Thaler, BehavioralLaw and Economics (forthcoming).
' These understandings sometimes go under the name of behavioral research or behavioral decision theory.
2 I draw here on Richard H. Thaler, Quasi Rational Economics (Sage 1991); John
Conlisk, Why Bounded Rationality?,34 J Econ Lit 669 (1996).
There is of course much controversy in specifying what rational choice models require. Some of the evidence I discuss shows how people react to the presence of decision
costs, and it is far from irrational to take those costs into account. It may also be fully rational to consider the effects of social norms on choice, since norm violations can count as
costs. It is far less important to struggle over whether the evidence shows violations of"rationality" than to be as clear as possible on how human beings actually behave; it is the
latter issue that I am concerned with here.
' This is a prominent theme in the work of Amos Tversky, taking "normative accounts" to refer to expected utility theory; Tversky's emphasis here is on cognitive errors.
See, for example, Amos Tversky, Rational Theory and Constructive Choice, in Kenneth J.
Arrow, et al, eds, The RationalFoundationsofEconomic Behavior 185 (St. Martin's 1996).
See, for example, Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky, Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision Under Risk, 47 Econometrica 263 (1979); Graham Loomes and Robert Sugden, Regret Theory: An Alternative Theory of Rational Choice Under Certainty, 92 Econ J
805 (1982).
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are playing a large and mounting role in many fields within economics and other social sciences.
Oddly, the relevant research has yet to find a significant
place in the economic analysis of law.6 An enormous gap remains
to be filled. This gap is especially important for economic analysis
of law, which is concerned in significant part with nonmarket behavior. It is here that deviations from the conventional model
are-it is generally conceded-most likely to occur.'
Much behavioral work suggests that preferences and values
are sometimes constructed rather than elicited by social situations.8 "[O]bserved preferences are not simply read off some master list; they are actually constructed in the elicitation process....
Different elicitation procedures highlight different aspects of options and suggest alternative heuristics, which may give rise to
inconsistent responses."' People do not generally consult a freestanding "preference menu" from which selections are made at
the moment of choice; preferences can be products of procedure,
description, and context at the time of choice. "Alternative descriptions of the same choice problems lead to systematically different preferences; strategically equivalent elicitation procedures
give rise to different choices; and the preference between x and y
often depends on the choice set in which they are embedded.""
What has been learned about human behavior and choice should
be linked, at the theoretical and empirical levels, with analysis of
the legal system.

6

Much of the relevant research involves experiments and survey data, and hence it is

possible to question whether the findings are reliable in the real world. There is of course
a possibility that experiments, particularly in the form of answers to questionnaires, are
imperfect predictors of actual behavior. By this stage, however, there is adequate basis to
conclude that the findings I describe are replicated in the real world; in fact many of them
are based on real world evidence. See, for example, Daniel Kahneman, Jack L. Knetsch,
and Richard H. Thaler, ExperimentalTests of the Endowment Effect and the Coase Theorem, 98 J Pol Econ 1325 (1990) (cataloguing evidence from experimental and real world
settings). On the general topic, see Colin Camerer, Individual Decision Making, in John
H. Kagel and Alvin E. Roth, eds, The Handbook ofExperimentalEconomics 587 (Princeton
1995); Richard H. Thaler, The Psychology and Economics Conference Handbook, in Thaler,
Quasi RationalEconomics 189 (cited in note 2).
' See the revealing remarks to this effect in Jason F. Shogren and Dermot J. Hayes,
Resolving Differences in Willingness to Pay and Willingness to Accept: Reply, 87 Am Econ
Rev 241, 243 (1997) (criticizing general claims about endowment effects but acknowledging their importance in nonmarket settings).
' See Paul Slovic, The Construction of Preference, 50 Am Psych 364, 364-65 (1995);
Tversky, Rational Theory, in Arrow, et al, Economic Behavior (cited in note 4).
' Amos Tversky, Shmuel Sattath, and Paul Slovic, Contingent Weighting in Judgment
and Choice, 95 Psych Rev 371, 371 (1988).
z'Tversky, Rational Theory, in Arrow, et al, Economic Behavior at 186 (cited in note
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This is so especially because the legal system is pervasively
in the business of constructing procedures, descriptions, and contexts for choice. Of course the legal system creates procedures,
descriptions, and contexts in the course of litigated cases. For example, the alternatives (selected to be) placed before the jury or
judge may matter a great deal; liability or conviction on some
count A may very much depend on the nature of counts B, C, and
D. n In this respect the preferences and values of judges and juries may well be constructed, not elicited, by the legal system.
This is certainly true for the awarding of damages, where special
problems may arise. But similar points hold outside of the courtroom. The allocation of legal entitlements, and the structures
created for exchange (or nonexchange) by law, may well affect
both preferences' and values. Thus law can construct rather than
elicit preferences both internally, by affecting what goes on in
court, and externally, by affecting what happens in ordinary
transactions-market and nonmarket.
For purposes of analysis, we might distinguish among three
different tasks: positive, prescriptive, and normative. Positive
work is of course concerned with predictions. If, contrary to conventional assumptions, people dislike losses far more than they
like equivalent gains, predictions will go wrong insofar as they
rest on these conventional assumptions. As we will shortly see,
this point has important implications for positive analysis of law,
prominently including the Coase Theorem.
Prescriptive work is concerned with showing how society
might actually reach shared goals; this is a central purpose of
economic analysis of law. Consider the following information
campaigns, which conventional analysis deems equivalent: (a) if
you use energy conservation methods, you will save $X per year;
(b) if you do not use energy conservation methods, you will lose
$X per year. It turns out that information campaign (b) is far
more effective than information campaign (a).3 Some features of
human judgment, properly understood, undermine conventional
economic prescriptions about what will work best; they help explain, to take just one example, precisely why the public service
advertising slogan "drive defensively; watch out for the other
guy" is particularly ingenious.

"See text accompanying notes 29-31.
It may well be desirable to disaggregate this vexing idea into various component
parts; in fact this is one of the themes of this essay, which I leave mostly implicit. See
Cass R. Sunstein, Social Norms and Social Rules, 96 Colum L Rev 903, 931-39 (1996).
"See Elliot Aronson, The SocialAnimal 124-26 (Freeman 6th ed 1996).
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Normative work is of course concerned with what the legal
system should do. Recent revisions in understanding human behavior greatly unsettle certain arguments against paternalism in
law. They certainly do not make an affirmative case for paternalism; but they support a form of anti-antipaternalism. If, for
example, people use heuristic devices that lead to systematic errors, their judgments about how to deal with risks may be badly
misconceived.' 4 If people are unrealistically optimistic, they may
run risks because of a factually false belief in their own relative
immunity from harm, even if they are fully aware of the statistical facts. And if people's choices are based on incorrect judgments, at the time of choice, about what their experience will be
after the choice, there is reason to question whether respect for
choices rooted in these incorrect judgments is a good way to promote utility or welfare. None of these points makes a firm case for
legal paternalism, particularly since bureaucrats may be subject
to the same cognitive and motivational distortions as everyone
else. 5 But they do suggest that objections to paternalism should
be empirical and pragmatic, having to do with the possibility of
education and likely failures of government response, rather than
a priori in nature.
Now let me offer a few details, tracing some of the principal
findings 6 that emerge from behavioral research, and showing
" Thus the literature on heuristics and biases helps support the analysis in Stephen
Breyer, Breaking the Vicious Circle: Toward Effective Risk Regulation (Harvard 1993) (favoring technocratic assessments of risk).
" See W. Kip Viscusi, Fatal Tradeoffs: Public and Private Responsibilitiesfor Risk
(Oxford 1992).
1 The discussion is illustrative, not exhaustive. Other examples are plentiful. For example, people appear not to ignore sunk costs. See Thaler, Quasi Rational Economics at
11-13, 148-49 (cited in note 2). This point bears on predictions about the behavior of contracting parties. Nor do I provide an exhaustive discussion of framing effects. For example, if told that of 400 people who undergo a certain operation, 350 are alive after five
years, many more people will undergo the operation than if they are told that of 400 people who undergo an operation, 50 are dead after five years. See Donald A. Redelmeier, et
al, UnderstandingPatients'Decisions,270 JAMA 72, 73 (1993). This effect may reflect not
confusion about expected value, but instead the social meaning of the statement; when a
person says that a certain number will die, he may be signaling something about the nature of the option, and the signal may be different from the (mathematically equivalent)
statement that a certain number will live. For a contrasting view, see Willem A.
Wagenaar, Gideon Keren, and Sarah Lichtenstein, Islanders and hostages:Deep and surface structures of decision problems, in William M. Goldstein and Robin M. Hogarth, eds,
Research on judgment and decision making: Currents,connections, and controversies 552,
552-64 (Cambridge 1997) (discussing differences among mathematically equivalent situations).
People also make different judgments of probability after different descriptions of the
same problem, partly because a description that stresses the components of a category
(how likely is it that X will die from cancer, heart disease, or other natural causes?) produces higher numbers than one that refers to the category itself (how likely is it that X
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how they bear on positive, prescriptive, and normative work in
law.

17

I.

Loss AVERSION

People are especially averse to losses. 8 They are more displeased with losses than they are pleased with equivalent gainsroughly speaking, twice as displeased. 9 Contrary to economic
theory, people do not treat out-of-pocket costs and opportunity
costs as if they were equivalent.
Loss aversion has important implications for positive analysis of law. It means, for example, that the Coase Theorem is in
one respect quite wrong." The theorem is wrong because the allocation of the legal entitlement may well matter, in the sense that
those who are initially allocated an entitlement are likely to
value it more than those without the legal entitlement. Thus
workers allocated a (waivable) right to be discharged only for
cause may well value that right far more than they would if employers were allocated a (tradable) right to discharge at will; thus
breathers of air may well value their (tradable) right to be free
will die from natural causes?). See Amos Tversky and Derek J. Koehler, Support Theory:A
Nonextensional Representation of Subjective Probability, 101 Psych Rev 547, 550 (1994).
There is also a recent finding of a "focusing illusion," by which people, focusing on a component of well-being, think that it is far more important to well-being than it is in fact. See
David A. Schkade and Daniel Kahneman, Would You Be Happy If You Lived in California? A Focusing Illusion in Judgments of Well-Being 17 (unpublished manuscript). See
also Richard H. Thaler, The Winner's Curse: Paradoxes and Anomolies of Economic Life
(Sage 1994), for an instructive collection.
" An interesting question is whether these various effects vary across cultures and
(relatedly) whether they might be changed through education. There is evidence that the
results of the ultimatum game are not culturally variant, see Colin Camerer and Richard
H. Thaler, Anomalies: Ultimatums, Dictators and Manners, 9 J Econ Persp 209, 211-19
(Spring 1995); Alvin E. Roth, BargainingExperiments, in Kagel and Roth, eds, Handbook
ofExperimentalEconomics at 282-88 (cited in note 6). But this is at most a start.
Of special interest is the fact that pigeons and rats appear to behave in accordance
with prospect theory rather than expected utility theory! See John H. Kagel, Raymond C.
Battalio, and Leonard Green, Economic Choice Theory: An ExperimentalAnalysis of Animal Behavior 162-67 (Cambridge 1995).
18 Kalmeman, Knetsch, and Thaler, 98 J Pol Econ at 1328 (cited in note 6); Thaler,
Quasi RationalEconomics at 143 (cited in note 2); Camerer, Individual Decision Making,
in Kagel and Roth, eds, Handbook of ExperimentalEconomics at 665-70 (cited in note 6).
Loss aversion is an aspect of prospect theory. See Kahneman and Tversky, 47
Econometrica at 274-89 (cited in note 5). On policy implications, see Jack L. Knetsch, Reference States, Fairness,and Choice of Measure to Value Environmental Changes, in Max
H. Bazerman et al, eds, Environment,Ethics, and Behavior 13 (New Lexington 1997).
'
ahneman, Knetsch, and Thaler, 98 J Pol Econ at 1339 (cited in note 6) (reporting
data showing that the median value of an object was twice as much for a person acting as
a seller than a person acting as a buyer).
' Id at 1344-45. The theorem remains current insofar as it suggests that the legal entitlement will not, under the stated conditions, affect efficiency.
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from air pollution far more than they would if polluters had been
given a (tradable) right to emit polluting substances into the air.
The legal entitlement creates an endowment effect, that is, a
greater valuation stemming from the mere fact of endowment.
This effect has been observed in many contexts. 1
There is a further point. People are averse to losses, but
whether an event "codes" as a loss or a gain depends not on simple facts but on a range of contextual factors, including how the
event is framed. The status quo is usually the reference point, so
that losses are understood as such by reference to existing distributions and practices;' but it is possible to manipulate the frame
so as to make a change "code" as a loss rather than a gain, or vice
versa. Consider a company that says "cash discount" rather than
"credit card surcharge"; or a parent who says that for behavior X
(rather than behavior Y) a child will be rewarded, as opposed to
saying that for behavior Y (rather than behavior X) a child will be
punished;"3 or familiar advertisements to the effect that "you
cannot afford not to" use a certain product. In environmental
regulation, it is possible to manipulate the reference point by insisting that policymakers are trying to "restore" water or air
quality to its state at date X; a proposal to "improve" air or water
quality from date Y may "code" quite differently. The restoration
M
time matters a great deal to people's judgment.'
For present purposes, the most important source of reference
points is the law: Where has the legal system placed the initial
entitlement? Much research remains to be done on the effects of
this initial allocation. The point bears, for example, on the distinction between "subsidies" and "penalties" that has proved so
" See id at 1325-29; Cass R. Sunstein, Endogenous Preferences, Environmental Law,
in Cass R. Sunstein, Free Markets and Social Justice 245 (Oxford 1997).
' See William Samuelson and Richard Zeckhauser, Status Quo Bias in Decision Making, 1 J Risk & Uncertainty 7, 9 (1988). Status quo bias is related to the phenomenon of
"commission bias": people would much prefer to make an error of omission than one of
commission, even in the context of vaccinating their children, where commission bias can
greatly increase risks to children. See Ilana Ritov and Jonathan Baron, Reluctance to Vaccinate: Omission Bias and Ambiguity, 3 J Behav Decision Making 263, 263 (1990). Compare the finding that the status quo becomes more attractive when there are two alternatives rather than one. Thus doctors, policymakers, and ordinary people, in situations of
choice, may be ambivalent between a status quo option (stay home and study tonight, prescribe the ordinary course of treatment, do not depart from existing policy) and a single
option; the introduction of a new alternative makes the status quo more appealing. See
Amos Tversky and Eldar Shafir, Choice Under Conflict: The Dynamics of Defined Decisions, 3 Psychol Sci 358 (1992).
' Personal experience suggests that this works!
"See Robin Gregory, Sarah Lichtenstein, and Donald MacGregor, The Role of Past
Status in DeterminingReference Points for Policy Decisions, 55 Organizational Behavior
and Human Decisions Processes 195 (1993).
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crucial to the law governing unconstitutional conditions." This
distinction can be understood as responsive to the phenomenon of
loss aversion, and framing effects very much influence judgments
about whether a measure constitutes a subsidy or a penalty."
Loss aversion also raises serious questions about the goal of
the tort system. Should damages measure the amount that would
restore an injured party to the status quo ante, or should they reflect the amount that an injured party would demand to be subject to the injury before the fact? Juries seem to believe that the
amount that would be demanded pre-injury is far greater than
the amount that would restore the status quo ante. The legal
system appears generally to see compensation as a mechanism
for restoring the status quo ante, although it does not seem to
have made this choice in any self-conscious or systematic way.
Loss aversion also has large implications for the choice between
liability rules and property rules. Property rules allow a taking
based on the entitlement holder's "willingness to accept"; liability
rules frame the question in terms of "willingness to pay." The
economic literature on the choice between the two generally does
not recognize that the resulting valuations may be dramatically
different. 8
Consider too the fact that people may well choose A over B
when asked the question "which of two options do you accept,"
but B over A when asked the question, "which of these two options do you reject," at least if A has both more positive and more
negative features than B. In the "accept" frame, the positive features stand out; in the "reject" frame, the negative features stand
out.29 This point bears on legal strategy before both juries and
judges.

II. EXTREMENESS AVERSION
People are averse to extremes. Whether an option is extreme
depends on the stated alternatives. Extremeness aversion gives
rise to compromise effects. As between given alternatives, people
seek a compromise. In this, as in other respects, the framing of

See Geoffirey R. Stone, et al, ConstitutionalLaw 319-23 (Little, Brown 3d ed 1994).
See, for example, Harrisv McRae, 448 US 297, 315-18 (1980).
See Edward J. McCaffrey, Daniel J. Kahneman, and Matthew L. Spitzer, Framing
the Jury:Cognitive Perspectiveson Painand SufferingAwards, 81 Va L Rev 1341, 1372-73
(1995).
See, for example, Louis Kaplow and Steven Shavell, PropertyRules versus Liability
Rules: An EconomicAnalysis, 109 Harv L Rev 713, 730-32 (1996).
See Eldar Shafir, Itamar Sinonson, and Amos Tversky, Reason-based choice, in
Goldstein and Hogarth, eds, Judgment 69, 73-76 (cited in note 16).
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choice matters; the introduction of unchosen, apparently irrelevant alternatives into the frame can alter the outcome. When, for
example, people are choosing between some small radio A and a
mid-size radio B, most may well choose A; but the introduction of
a third, large radio C is likely to lead many people to choose B instead. ° Thus, the introduction of a third, unchosen (and in that
sense irrelevant) option may produce a switch in choice as between the two original options. Almost everyone has had the experience of switching to (say) the second-most expensive item on
some menu of options, and of choosing that item partly because of
the presence of the most expensive item.31
Extremeness aversion suggests that a simple axiom of conventional economic theory-involving the irrelevance of added,
unchosen alternatives-is wrong.2 It also has large consequences
for legal advocacy and judgment, as well as for predictions about
the effects of law. How can a preferred option best be framed as
the "compromise" choice? When should a lawyer argue in the alternative, and what kinds of alternative arguments are most effective? This should be a central question for advocates to answer. Juries and judges may try to choose a compromise solution,
and what "codes" as the compromise solution depends on what alternatives are made available. In elections, medical interventions, and policymaking, compromise effects may matter a great
deal.
III.

SELF-SERVING BIAS, UNREALIsTIC OPTIMISM, AND
OVERCONFIDENCE

People's judgments about fairness are self-serving; people
also tend to be both unrealistically optimistic and overconfident
about their judgments.3 In any random couple, it is highly likely
that addition of answers to the question, "what percentage of the
domestic work do you do?" will produce a number greater than
100 percent. The point bears on the otherwise largely inexplicable
phenomenon of bargaining impasses. Why don't more cases settle? Why does the legal system spend so much on dispute settle-

See Mark Kelman, Yuval Rottenstreich, and Amos Tversky, Context-Dependence in
Legal DecisionMaking, 25 J Legal Stud 287, 288 (1996).
" Compare the phenomenon of"tradeoff contrast": the introduction of a third alternative may make some characteristic of the choice especially salient and thus affect judgment. See id.
See Amartya Sen, Internal Consistencyof Choice, 61 Econometrica 495 (1993).
See Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky, Conflict Resolution:A CognitivePerspective, in Kenneth J. Arrow, et al, eds, Barriers to Conflict Resolution 44, 46-50 (Norton
1995).
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ment? Part of the answer lies in the fact that self-serving bias-a
belief that one deserves more than other people tend to think-affects both parties to a negotiation, and this makes agreement
very difficult.3 4
Unrealistic optimism and self-serving bias bear on individual
risk-bearing, and hence on the role of the regulatory state, especially in the area of dangers to life and health. Even factually informed people tend to think that risks are less likely to materialize for themselves than for others. Thus there is systematic overconfidence in risk judgments, as the vast majority of people believe that they are less likely than others to be subject to automobile accidents, infection from AIDS, heart attacks, asthma, and
many other health risks.35 In one survey, for example, 90 percent
of automobile drivers considered themselves to be above-average
drivers.3 6 In another survey, students asked to envision their future said that they were far less likely than their classmates to be
fired from a job, to have a heart attack or get cancer, to be divorced after a few years of marriage, or to have a drinking problem."
Unrealistic optimism appears to characterize people in most
social categories." People systematically underestimate the extent to which they are at risk, and perceptions of relative invulnerability affect preventive health practices. A random community-wide survey of attitudes toward health risks found systematic belief of above-average immunity from risk.4 ° Older people
underestimate the likelihood that they will be in a car accident or
contract major diseases.4 ' Gay men appear systematically to underestimate the chance that they will get AIDS, even though they
do not lack information about AIDS risks in general.4 2 Consider
as well recent empirical evidence that workers have little under-

' See id; Linda Babcock and George Loewenstein, Explaining BargainingImpasse:
The Role ofSelf-Serving Biases, 11 J Econ Persp 109, 119-21 (1997).
See Neil D. Weinstein, Optimistic Biases About Personal Risks, 246 Science 1232
(1989).
Shelley E. Taylor, Positive Illusions: Creative Self-Deception and the Healthy Mind
10-11 (Basic 1990).
Id at 33.

' Laurie J. Bauman and Karolynn Siegel, MisperceptionAmong Gay Men of the Risk
for AIDS Associated with Their Sexual Behavior, 17 J Applied Soc Psych 329, 330-31
(1987).
' Neil D. Weinstein, Unrealistic Optimism About Susceptibility to Health Problems:
Conclusions from a Community-Wide Sample, 10 J Behavioral Medicine 481, 497-98
(1987).
'1 Taylor, Positive Illusions at 33 (cited in note 36).
Bauman and Siegel, 17 J Applied Soc Psych at 331 (cited in note 39).

1184

The University of ChicagoLaw Review

[64:1175

standing of the existence of an "at-will" rule for employment, believing instead that workers have strong legal protections against
arbitrary firings.4 3 This evidence is consistent with the hypothesis
that people are systematically optimistic; it may suggest a pervasive phenomenon with respect to popular understandings of the
law.
Unrealistic optimism and self-serving bias are relevant to the
positive and prescriptive tasks of law. Efforts to educate people
about risk may run afoul of unrealistic optimism; hence mere statistical knowledge may fail to produce adequate information.
Moreover, efforts to increase consensual solutions must take account of self-serving bias; problems with negotiated rulemaking,
one of the most popular new developments in administrative law,
may have self-serving bias at their roots. Evidence of self-serving
bias also complicates the widespread view that people often overstate low-probability events. While people may sometimes think
that low-probability events have higher probability than they in
fact do," many individual agents think that they personally are
peculiarly less susceptible to such events, which may lead them
to underestimate rather than overestimate probabilities. Note
also the possibility of debiasing strategies; it appears possible to
reduce self-serving bias by requiring people to list the weaknesses in their own view or case.'
IV. DECISION UTILITY VS. EXPERIENCE UTILITY
In economics, it is often assumed that the utility of experience is best measured by the anticipated utility shown by people's
decisions. But a good deal of recent research" shows that there
may well be systematic differences between the utility expected at
the time of decision and the utility actually experienced as a result
of decision. People's judgments about their experience at the time
of decision can be mistaken; they may have a hard time assessing
what the experience will actually be like.
There are many examples of this divergence between decision utility and experience utility. We can infer from the phe"See Pauline Kim, BargainingWith Imperfect Information:A Study of Worker Perception of Legal Protectionin an At-Will World, 83 Cornell L Rev (forthcoming 1997).
This effect may come from the availability heuristic. See notes 61 and 62.
See Linda Babcock, George Loewenstein, and Samuel Issacharoff, DebiasingLitigation Impasse (forthcoming J L & Social Inquiry).
"See Daniel Kahneman, New Challenges to the RationalityAssumption, in Arrow, et
al, eds, Economic Behavior at 203 (cited in note 4); George Loewenstein and David
Schkade, Wouldn't It Be Nice? PredictingFuture Feelings, to appear in E. Diener, N.
Schwartz, and D. Kahneman, eds, Hedonic Psychology: Scientific Approaches to Enjoyment, Suffering, and Well-being (forthcoming Sage).
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nomenon of loss aversion that people value goods more when they
own them than when they do not. 7 This "endowment effect" has
been observed in many settings.4 8 But in recent experiments, people have been unable to predict the endowment effect, and thus
unable to predict their own tastes.4 9 This finding is paralleled by
many studies showing that people do not accurately predict the
consequences of certain major events, such as winning the lottery
or becoming paraplegic. (Winning the lottery produces much
lower hedonic gains than expected, and people adjust to becoming
paraplegic much more easily than expected.) 0
An especially important example of inaccurate anticipated
utility comes from a study dealing with HIV testing. People are
quite terrified of their reaction if they find that they are HIVpositive; they predict a high degree of panic and depression. But
evidence suggests that people are able to adapt fairly well to the
bad news, and their panic and depression are far less severe than
they feared. 1 Pessimistic expectations about how they would react to a positive result might therefore lead people to "undertest";
people are likely to be especially averse to undergoing a process of
which they are very fearful. It might follow that regulatory approaches-education, persuasion, financial incentives, conceivably coercion-would make a good deal of sense.
Some economists have urged that people have adequate information about the risks of smoking and that additional regulation is therefore inappropriate.5 2 Perhaps most people do know
many of the basic "facts." But a study of high school students
suggests a problem. About one-third of adolescent smokers believed that there was no risk from smoking a pack of cigarettes
daily for the first few years after starting to smoke. Young people
who smoked believed that they were personally less at risk from
smoking. And 85 percent of high school teenagers who smoked occasionally believed that they would not be smoking in five years,
whereas only 58 percent had actually quit after five years, and 37
percent had increased their consumption. About 32 percent of

, See Part L

See Thaler, QuasiRationalEconomics at 167-86 (cited in note 2).
See George Loewenstein and Daniel Adler, A Bias in the Predictionof Tastes, 105
Econ J 929, 935-36 (1995); Loewenstein and Schkade, Wouldn't it be nice? (cited in note
46).
See Loewenstein and Schkade, Wouldn't it be nice? (cited in note 46).
SI See Elaine M. Sieff, Robyn M. Dawes, and George Loewenstein, Anticipated Versus
Actual Reactionto HIV Test Results (forthcoming Am J Psych).
See W. Kip Viscusi, Smoking: Making the Risky Decision (Oxford 1993).
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those who smoked one pack daily believed that they would quit in
five years, but only 13 percent did in fact.53
When people's decisions mispredict their experience, a common argument against paternalism-to the effect that ordinary
people choose what will promote their welfare-is no longer plausible. Perhaps it will ultimately be possible to be systematic
about issues of this kind-to know, with some precision, when
people's decisions will produce bad experiences.
V.

COOPERATION, FAIRNESS, AND THE APPEARANCE OF FAIRNESS

Economists sometimes assume that people are selfinterested. This may well be true, and often it is a useful simplifying assumption. But people also may want to act fairly and,
perhaps more importantly, they want to be seen to act fairly, especially among nonstrangers. For purposes of understanding law,
what is especially important is that people may sacrifice their
economic self-interest in order to be, or to appear, fair.
Consider, for example, the ultimatum game.'M The people
who run the game give some money, on a provisional basis, to the
first of two players. The first player is instructed to offer some
part of the money to the second player. If the second player accepts that amount, he can keep what is offered, and the first
player gets to keep the rest. But if the second player rejects the
offer, neither player gets anything. Both players are informed
that these are the rules. No bargaining is allowed. Using standard assumptions about rationality, self-interest, and choice,
economists predict that the first player should offer a penny and
the second player should accept. But this is not what happens.
Offers usually average between 30 percent and 40 percent of the
total. Offers of less than 20 percent are often rejected. Often there
is a 50-50 division. These results cut across the level of the stakes
and also across diverse cultures.5
The results of the ultimatum game are highly suggestive.
Perhaps people will not violate norms of fairness, even when doing so is in their economic self-interest, at least if the normviolations would be public. Do companies always raise prices
when circumstances create short-term scarcity? For example, are
there social constraints on price increases for snow shovels after a
See Paul Slovic, What does it mean to know a cumulative risk? (forthcoming J Behavioral Decision Making).
" See Roth, BargainingExperiments, in Kagel and Roth, eds, Handbook ofExperimental Economics at 282-88 (cited in note 6), and Camerer and Thaler, 9 J Econ Persp at 20918 (cited in note 17), for a general discussion.
' Camerer and Thaler, 9 J Econ Persp at 210-11 (cited in note 17).
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snowstorm, or for umbrellas during a rainstorm? It may well be
that contracting parties are reluctant to take advantage of one
another's misfortunes, partly because of social constraints on selfinterested behavior. Here there is much room for future work.
Experimental work similarly shows a high degree of cooperation in prisoners' dilemma situations, especially when people are
speaking with one another.56 There is now a good deal of evidence
about the mechanisms by which cooperation is produced or sustained.5 7 Group identity appears to be important, as does the
practice of norm-enforcement in the private sphere.5 8 These
points are especially important to law and, in particular, to the
relationship between law and "norm cascades," producing largescale behavioral shifts. In some contexts, the mere announcement
of a legal requirement can yield such shifts, especially when one
person's violation can be observed by others, and thus private enforcement becomes possible through the imposition of reputational sanctions.5 9
VI. HEURIsTIcs AND BIASES
People make judgments about probability on the basis of
heuristic devices, responsive perhaps to high costs of inquiry and
decision, that work in many cases but that tend also to lead to
systematic errors. 0 This work bears on the demand for (and
hence also the supply of) government services, including regulation. It also has implications for the jury system-suggesting that
juries are likely to make many mistakes in terms of probability
assessments and that correction of those mistakes is a large task
of the legal system. Here is a very brief description of several
heuristics of particular relevance to law, and of some possible responses.

For an overview, see John 0. Ledyard, Public Goods: A Survey of ExperimentalResearch, in Kagel and Roth, eds, Handbook ofExperimentalEconomics 111, 111-73 (cited in
note 6).
See Robyn M. Dawes, Alphons J.C. van de Kragt, and John M. Orbell, Not me or
thee but we: The importance of group identity in eliciting cooperation in dilemma situations: Experimental manipulations,in Goldstein and Hogarth, eds, Judgment 379, 389-91
(cited in note 16).
"See Robert A. Kagan and Jerome H. Skolnick, Banning Smoking: Compliance Without Enforcement, in Robert L. Rabin and Stephen D. Sugarman, eds, Smoking Policy: Law,
Politics,and Culture 69, 76-85 (Oxford 1993).
See id; Sunstein, 96 Colum L Rev at 945-46 (cited in note 12).
See Camerer, Individual Decision Making, in Kagel and Roth, eds, Handbook ofExperimentalEconomics at 590-616 (cited in note 6).
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A. Availability
People tend to think that risks are more serious when an incident is readily called to mind or "available.""' If pervasive, the
availability heuristic will produce systematic errors. Assessments
of risk will be pervasively biased, in the sense that people will
think that some risks (of a nuclear accident, for example) are
high, whereas others (of a stroke, for example) are relatively low.
"Availability cascades" can produce a large demand for law, as in
the familiar "pollutant of the month" syndrome in environmental
law. We lack a firm understanding of how availability cascades
occur and of how institutions might be designed to produce appropriate responses.'
B. Anchoring
Often people make probability judgments on the basis of an
initial value, or "anchor," from which they make insufficient adjustments.6 3 The initial value may have an arbitrary or irrational
source. When this is so, the probability assessment may go badly
wrong, as will all future assessments based on the original anchor. This point bears on jury deliberations reconstructing the
facts; an original "anchor," based on certain evidence at trial, may
be hard to dislodge. The point also suggests pervasive problems
with damage determinations, where arbitrary anchors may loom
large. For example, in the case of punitive damages or damages
for pain and suffering, libel, or intentional infliction of emotional
distress, an enormous amount is likely to turn on the plaintiff's
original demand.
C.

Representativeness

Judgments about probability are in large part judgments
about whether some process A will bring about some event B. For
example, under what circumstances will driving produce significant increases in air pollution or fatal accidents? When will airbags produce risks to children? Do disposable diapers cause pollution problems? In answering such questions, people ask about the
extent to which A is representative of B in the sense that it resembles B. This point suggests that people will be insensitive to
" See Kahneman and Tversky, Conflict Resolution, in Arrow, et al, eds,
ConflictResolution at 47-48 (cited in note 33); Viscusi, FatalTradeoffs (cited in
' Timur Kuran and Cass R. Sunstein, Availability Cascades and Risk
(work in progress), is an effort to deal with these issues.
' See Kahneman and Tversky, Conflict Resolution, in Arrow, et al, eds,
ConflictResolution at 54-55 (cited in note 33).

Barriers to
note 15).
Regulation
Barriers to
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the sample size, misunderstand the phenomenon of regression to
the mean, have excessive confidence in their own judgments, and
misconstrue the effect on probability of base-rate frequency.' As
a result, people may systematically misunderstand risk levels.
Consider, as an example, the question whether exposure to pesticides is likely to cause cancer. If "pesticides" are taken to be representative of cancer, people will judge the probability of causation to be quite high. But this judgment may well be mistaken.
D.

Case-Based Decision Theory

Heuristic devices are often used when the costs of deliberation are high; in such cases, second-order decisions, operating as
default rules, can make particularized assessments less necessary. An important way of reducing decision costs is to make assessments on the basis of previous cases rather than through particularized assessments of relevant costs and benefits.6 5 People often reason in this way, calling to mind particular cases and seeing how the problem at hand compares with those cases; this can
be an important method of reducing decision costs.
A view of case-based decisions as a way of minimizing decision costs-while producing acceptably low error costs-has significant consequences for the understanding of law. Of course,
adjudication is a form of case-based reasoning. And we may be
able better to understand its nature, and thus its vices and virtues, if we see it as an alternative to both expected utility theory
and rule-bound decisions. This alternative responds to the distinctive characteristics of judicial institutions.6 6
Of related interest are findings about the consequences of
basing choice and decision on reasons." An important result is
that many decisions (and, in particular, nonintuitive violations of
value-maximization) are better understood if one envisions decision makers as resorting to and relying on compelling reasons for
Id at 46.

Itzhak Gilboa and David Schmeidler, Case-Based Decision Theory, 110 Q J Econ
605, 608-10 (1995).
Identification of the settings in which case-based decisions make sense is a complex
matter. Case-based decisions are better than decisions based on expected utility theory
when the latter imposes excessive cognitive demands. Case-based decisions are better
than rule-bound decisions when particularistic judgments involve fewer errors without
imposing high decision costs. It is possible that for the legal system, case-based decisions
are often best, because judges can reduce their cognitive burdens in this way without producing the errors of (crude) rules. Of course rules are often best. For discussion, see Cass
R. Sunstein, Legal Reasoning and PoliticalConflict 161-64 (Oxford 1996).
See Shafir, Simonson, and Tversky, Reason-basedchoice, in Goldstein and Hogarth,
eds, Judgment at 89-92 (cited in note 29).
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their decisions, rather than focusing on the options' value. This
perspective is highly relevant to the law, and to the "constructive"
approach to decision making emphasized here.
E.

Statistics, Not Intuitions

Despite the possible advantages, in some settings, of casebased decision theory, an understanding of heuristic devices suggests that single-shot, intuitionistic judgments are frequently less
accurate than judgments based on statistical regularities." This
is particularly true of probabilistic judgments, for which people
tend to have great confidence in their particular assessments.
'People are overconfident in evaluating the accuracy of their beliefs one at a time." 9 The point is important to law, since participants in law often rely on projections of probability based on a
highly particularistic understanding of a fact pattern. How likely
is it, for example, that a certain course of action would cause
harm? And how likely is it that a particularistic judgment, from a
court, will perform better than a rule?
Recent research suggests that in matters relevant to law,
statistical judgments should receive greater attention. Experts in
medical care, for example, responded to questionnaires with optimistic and inaccurate judgments about the median time between triage in an emergency department and administration of
antibiotics in children with meningitis. 0 It is interesting but perhaps not surprising to find that an expert witness in a malpractice case much understated the median time; but it is more surprising that the spectrum of opinions among doctors as a whole
differs significantly from the statistical reality. The phenomenon
appears to be attributable to certain biases affecting anecdotal
recall-bias toward the perceived outcome and hindsight bias, by
which people believe that an outcome that occurred was highly
likely to do so." In medical malpractice cases, and perhaps a wide
range of other cases involving questions of negligence founded on
judgments of ordinary practice, the legal system would do well to
move from anecdotes and experts to statistical data. "Medical expert testimony that differs significantly from these values has no
basis in reality and ought not to be credited."72
See Daniel Kahneman and Dan Lovallo, Timid Choices and Bold Forecasts:A Cognitive Perspectiveon Risk Taking, 39 Management Science 17, 19-20 (1993).
Id at 26.
See William L. Meadow, et al, Ought "StandardCare" Be the "Standardof Care?,
147 Am J Diseases of Children 40 (1993).
" Id at 43.
7 Id at 44.
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PROBABILITY RELATED "TASTES"

Here we are dealing not with factual errors, but with "tastes"
or preferences that lead people to favor certain approaches to
risk. Probability related tastes present hard questions for the
policy analyst. These tastes matter to law insofar as they bear on
the demand for legal regulation and insofar as they are highly
likely to affect judgments of both juries and judges.
A.

"All or Nothing"

People do not weight probabilities in a linear fashion. Most
importantly, they greatly prefer the elimination of a risk over the
diminution of a risk. Thus, it appears that people would much
rather see a risk of .001 reduced to zero than a risk of .002 reduced to .001." It is not clear whether this preference should be
characterized as irrational. Perhaps people receive a great deal of
peace of mind from an eliminated risk, and a risk of reduced
probability still creates residual fear. The point appears to be reflected in law. For example, the Clean Air Act speaks in terms of
ensuring safe levels of air quality, admittedly a highly misleading
way to set up the problem. 4
B. Ambiguity Aversion
A closely related "taste" is the avoidance of ambiguity. 5 At
least when they lack relevant knowledge, and know that they do,
people prefer situations of risk (in which probabilities can be assigned to outcomes) over situations of uncertainty (in which probabilities cannot be assigned). Thus people are averse to situations
of uncertain probability and try to avoid choices that place them
in such situations. Risk regulation is, of course, often undertaken
when probabilities cannot be assigned. If people are averse to
ambiguities, they may produce an incoherent pattern of regulation, perhaps based on an illusory perception, related to all-ornothing judgments, that some things are "safe" and others are
"dangerous."
C. Status Quo Bias
As noted, people evaluate situations largely in accordance
with their relation to a certain reference point; gains and losses
See Redelmeier, et al, 270 JAMA at 73 (cited in note 16).
"See 42 USC § 7409(b)(1) (1994).
See Craig R. Fox and Amos Tversky, Ambiguity Aversion and Comparative Ignorance, 110 Q J Econ 585 (1995).
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from the reference point are crucial. An ordinary reference is the
status quo, which produces status quo bias.76 The legal system is
certainly responsive to this kind of bias.77
VIII.

MENTAL AcCOUNTING

A simple and apparently uncontroversial assumption of most
economists is that money is fungible. But the assumption is
false.7" Money comes in compartments. People create "frames"
that result in mental accounts through which losses and gains,
including losses and gains in simple monetary terms, are not
fungible with each other. A glance at ordinary practice shows
that people often organize decisions in terms of separate budgets
and accounts. Thus some money is for retirement; some is for vacation; some is for college tuition; some is for mortgage or rental
payments. Mental accounting is an important aspect of financial
self-control.
The practice of mental accounting has a range of implications
for law and policy. It suggests, for example, that government may
be able to create certain mental accounts by creative policymaking. And it suggests that there may be a demand for publicly created mental accounts, perhaps as a self-control strategy, as for
example with Social Security and other programs with an apparent paternalistic dimension. Some statutes that appear to prevent people from making choices as they wish may be best understood as responsive to the widespread desire to have separate
mental accounts. Of course, there are private mechanisms for accomplishing this goal; but lawyers will not understand these
mechanisms well unless they see that money itself is not fungible.
IX. THE DIFFIcuLTY, OUTSIDE OF MARKETS, OF MAPPING
NORMATiVE JUDGMENTS ONTO DOLLARS

Often the legal system requires judges or juries to make
judgments of some kind and then to translate those judgments
into dollar amounts. How does this translation take place? Can it
be done well? Research suggests that in many contexts, normative judgments are both predictable and nonarbitrary.79 When
76 See note 22 and accompanying text.

.See Sunstein, Endogenous Preferences,in Sunstein, FreeMarkets at 252-53 (cited in
note 21).
" See Thaler, QuasiRationalEconomics at 26, 92 (cited in note 2); see also Viviana A.
Zelizer, The Social Meaning of Money (Basic 1994).
' See Daniel Kahneman and flana Ritov, Determinants of Stated Willingness to Pay
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asked to assess bad behavior that might produce punitive damages on a bounded numerical scale, people come up with relatively uniform judgments. Similar uniformity has been found in
contingent valuations of environmental amenities.8 o But the act of
mapping those normative judgments onto an unbounded dollar
scale produces considerable unpredictability and arbitrariness.
When people are asked how much they are willing to pay to protect two thousand birds, or how much a defendant should be
punished for reckless conduct leading to personal injury, the
numbers they generate seem to be stabs in the dark. The legal
system, however, frequently relies on just such stabs. Thus, the
award of damages for libel, sexual harassment, and pain and suffering are infected by severe difficulties, as is the award of punitive damages in general. An understanding of these difficulties
may well lead to concrete reform proposals. Perhaps the "mapping" can occur by a legislative or regulatory body that decides, in
advance, on how a normative judgment made on a bounded numerical scale or by comparison to preselected scenarios can be
translated into dollars.
X.

INTERTEMPORAL CHOICE AND DIscouNT RATES

A conventional assumption of economics is that people will
discount both costs and benefits to present value." A thousand
dollars today is worth more than a thousand dollars a year from
now, because the future amount cannot be invested or used. But
to what extent do people behave in accordance with this understanding? Sometimes people appear to have negative discount
rates.82 Thus, teachers often choose to be paid in twelve monthly
installments (September-August) rather than nine (SeptemberJune); and people often receive tax refunds from the government
in lieu of adjusting the withholding rate, thus providing interest-

For Public Goods: A Study in the Headline Method, 9 J Risk & Uncertainty 5, 28-30
(1994); Sunstein, Kahneman, and Schkade, Assessing Punitive Damages (with notes on
cognition and valuation in law) (cited in note t). The latter paper, based on 900 subjects,
discusses computer construction of 120 million juries, including (for example) all white juries, all male juries, all poor juries, all female juries, all Hispanic juries, well educated juries, poorly educated juries. It finds that these disparate juries evaluate outrageousness
and appropriate punishment in similar ways when using a bounded numerical scale of 1
to 6. The story is much more complex for an unbounded dollar scale.
o See Kahneman and Ritov, 9 J Risk & Uncertainty at 28-30 (cited in note 79).
8' See Daniel A. Farber and Paul A. Hemnersbaugh, The Shadow of the Future, 46
Vand L Rev 267 (1993); George Tolley, et al, Valuing Health for Policy 130-33, 310-12
(Chicago 1994).
See George Loewenstein and Richard H. Thaler, Intertemporal Choice, in Goldstein
and Hogarth, eds, Judgment 365 (cited in note 16), on which I draw for this section.
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free loans to the government.8 3 There is also evidence that workers prefer to have increasing wage rates, in which weekly wages
increase each year, even though (in the aggregate equivalent) decreasing wage rates would provide more money quickly.M Loss
aversion may help explain this phenomenon; a decreasing wage
reflects constant losses from the reference point.
But sometimes people are myopic, in the sense that their behavior reveals extremely high positive discount rates. Studies of
teenagers and purchasers of energy inefficient appliances suggest
a large and puzzling willingness to disregard future costs and
benefits.8 5 The line between absence of information and myopia
may be thin in practice, but it appears that well-informed people
sometimes treat the future as if it barely mattered.
These findings have many implications for law and policy.
Environmental protection, for example, requires development of
an appropriate discount rate for both costs and benefits.8 6 It is not
clear that regulators should base their decisions on people's intertemporal tastes;" but if they do, the conventional economic
understanding, embodied in current policy, may be wrong. Calculation of damages in cases of future losses may well require a
discount rate; here people's tastes probably matter a great deal,
and use of a conventional discount rate may produce errors. Myopia bears above all on the prescriptive and normative tasks of
law. Where people are myopic, information may not be enough to
produce optimal behavior. And on the normative side, the existence of myopia may support paternalism, or at least antiantipaternalism.
Economic analysis of law has proceeded on the basis of inaccurate understandings of decision and choice. For the last generation those understandings have proved fruitful in spite of their
flaws. Before economics became part of the study of law, people
analyzed law without having much, if any, sense of how to explore its effects on behavior. Better understandings were not yet
available, and simplicity has its virtues. But it is past time to see
what can be learned-whether positive, prescriptive, or normative-from bringing to bear more accurate understandings about
human behavior.
Id at 366.
See id at 373.
Id at 366.
See Peter S. Mennell and Richard B. Stewart, EnvironmentalLaw and Policy 10911, 114 (Little, Brown 2d ed 1994).
See Tolley, et al, Valuing Health at 130-33, 310-12 (cited in note 81).
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In this essay I have at most sketched those understandings.
A large question involves the extent to which education and "debiasing" can counteract cognitive and motivational distortions, so
as to eliminate some of the effects described above. 8 Despite large
recent advances, behavioral research remains in an early stage.
An understanding of its implications for law and policy will take
a long time. Let's go to work.

' Some of these effects, such as a taste for fairness, should not be characterized as distortions; on the contrary, such tastes may help prevent unfortunate outcomes in prisoners'
dilemma situations. See Robert H. Frank, Thomas Gilovich, and Dennis T. Regan, Does
Studying EconomicsInhibit Cooperation?,7 J Econ Persp 159, 163-67 (Spring 1993).
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